农村集体土地制度创新对地价的影响——来自南海的证据

THE IMPACTS OF RURAL COLLECTIVE LAND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION ON LAND PRICE：EVIDENCE FROM NANHAI

关键词:  集体建设用地  市场化改革  制度安排  土地价格  SCP  影响机制

Key words:  rural collective construction land  market reform  institutional change  land price  SCP  impact mechanism

摘要:

目的 探讨集体建设用地自下而上与自上而下的市场化制度安排对集体建设用地价格的影响及其作用机制，以期为构建城乡统一的建设用地市场提供依据。方法 文章利用2012年—2022年广东省佛山市南海区集体建设用地交易数据，基于制度变迁理论结合SCP范式分析，应用多元线性回归模型、通径分析和决策计算，实证分析各因子对集体建设用地价格的影响程度、作用机制和决策变化。结果 （1）市场化制度安排对集体建设用地价格有显著正影响，自上而下阶段集体建设用地价格比自下而上阶段的高53.11%。（2）市场化制度安排进入自上而下阶段，集体建设用地价格作用机制发生改变，主要决策因子由宏观经济因素转变为微观宗地特征，其中商服用地价格主要决策因子由宏观经济因素转为微观宗地特征，工业用地价格由宏观经济因素转为微观区位因素。（3）不同用途集体建设用地价格对自下而上至自上而下市场化改革的制度安排存在异质性响应，集体商服用地价格的最优路径主要通过用地面积的直接作用，而集体工业用地价格的最优路径主要通过CBD距离的间接作用。结论 自下而上至自上而下的制度变迁表现形式是市场结构、市场行为改变，但内在机制则是集体建设用地价格的决定性因素发生变化，中央自上而下入市改革发挥了市场的作用机制。

Abstract:

This study investigates the impact of market-oriented institutional arrangements for rural collective construction land—transitioning from a bottom-up to a top-down approach—on land prices and its underlying mechanism, so as to provide a foundation for establishing a unified urban-rural construction land market. Utilizing transaction data of rural collective construction land in Nanhai district, Guangdong province, from 2012 to 2022, and grounded in the theory of institutional change and the SCP paradigm, this research employed Multiple Linear Regression, Path Analysis, and Decision Calculus to empirically analyze the degree of influence, operational mechanism, and shifts in decision-making factors affecting rural collective construction land prices. The results showed that: (1) Market-oriented institutional arrangements exerted a significant positive impact on rural collective construction land prices. The price during the top-down stage was 53.11% higher than that during the bottom-up stage. (2) As institutional arrangements evolved into the top-down stage, and the price mechanism for rural collective construction land underwent changes. The primary decision-making factors influencing land prices shifted from macroeconomic factors to parcel characteristics. Specifically, the key determinants for commercial land prices changed from macroeconomic factors to parcel characteristics, while for industrial land prices, the dominant determinants shifted from macroeconomic factors to locational factors. (3) The prices of collective construction land for different uses show heterogeneous responses to the institutional shift from a bottom-up to a top-down market-oriented reform. The optimal path for regulating the price of collective commercial service land operates primarily through the direct effect of land area, whereas the optimal path for regulating the price of collective industrial land acts mainly through the indirect effect of distance from the central business district (CBD). In summary, the institutional change from bottom-up to top-down manifests as alterations in market structure and conduct. However, its intrinsic mechanism is the shift in the decisive factors affecting rural collective construction land prices. The top-down market-entry reform led by the central government gives full play to the market mechanism.