| 摘要: |
| 摘 要 研究目的:分析耕地非农化中中央政府、土地督察部门、地方政府和公民间博弈关系，探讨实施 土地督察制度的合理性。研究方法:完全信息静态博弈理论。研究结果:中央政府应当采取适宜强度的土 地督察制度，给予土地督察部门足够的激励和合理而明确的耕地保护目标，使公民成为耕地保护博弈中的 重要一方。研究结论:中央政府采取土地督察制度，地方政府违规是两者间博弈的纳什均衡。 |
| 关键词: 关键词 土地经济 纳什均衡 静态博弈 土地督察 完全信息 |
| DOI：10.7621/cjarrp.1005-9121.20100507 |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目: |
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| ANALYSIS OF LAND SUPERVISION BASED ON COMPLETE INFORMATION STATIC GAME |
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Zhan Chenhui
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School of Resource and Environment Science， Wuhan University， Wuhan 430079， China
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| Abstract: |
| Abstract The purpose of this paper was to analyze the game relations among central government， land supervision department， local government and citizen in the process of changing farmland into construction land， and discuss the rationality of implementing land supervision regime. Complete information static game theory was adopted for this research. The results showed that central government should take appropriately intensive land supervision re- gime and give land supervision department enough encourage and rational farmland protecting object to make citizen become an important role in farmland protecting game. The paper concluded that central government taking land su- pervision regime and local government violating rule was the Nash equilibrium of the game. |
| Key words: Keywords land economics Nash equilibrium static game land supervision complete information |
