| 摘要: |
| ［目的］秸秆有效处置需要政府和农户相互协作。文章研究不同行为主体秸秆处置行为的动态演化过程，并进一步解析不同偏好类型农户秸秆还田决策的约束条件。［方法］基于适度社会化个体偏好理论，通过分析政府和农户不同决策策略下的支付函数，采用演化博弈方法构建了农户和政府之间的动态演化模型，分析双方演化稳定状态的不同参数要求。［结果］（1）秸秆处置选择上，相对焚烧意愿强的自利型偏好农户，社会型偏好农户的还田意愿更强； （2）不同偏好类型的农户在约束条件发生变化时，其偏好会发生挤入或挤出效应，即由自利型偏好转为社会型偏好或者相反。［结论］解决秸秆焚烧等现象的有效措施是促使农户偏好结构的转变，增加挤入效应，减少挤出效应。由此获得的政策启示是，加强政府政策宣传、技术推广和法律法规的制定执行以及农村非正式组织的培育，促使自利型偏好农户向社会型偏好农户的转变，对提高农户秸秆还田等农村环境治理的参与度和满意度意义重大。 |
| 关键词: 秸秆治理秸秆还田演化博弈社会偏好型农户自利偏好型农户 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F323 |
| 基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目“多主体协同推进秸秆资源化利用的机制与路径研究”（20BGL175） |
|
| DECISION MAKING OF FARMERS WITH DIFFERENT PREFERENCE IN STRAW GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS*——FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY |
|
Jiang Weijun1,2,3，Yan Tingwu1,3※，Zhang Junbiao1,3
|
|
1. College of Economics & Management，Huazhong Agricultural University，Wuhan 430070, Hubei, China；2. College of Business, Huanggang Normal University, Huanggang 438000, Hubei, China；3. Hubei Rural Development Research Center，Wuhan 430070, Hubei, China
|
| Abstract: |
| Effective disposal of straw requires the cooperation between government and farmers. This paper studies the dynamic evolution process of straw disposal behavior of different actors and further explores the constraints of straw return decision of farmers with different preferences. Based on the theory of moderately socialized individual preference, this paper analyzed the payment function under different decision making strategies of government and farmers, constructed the dynamic evolution model between the farmers and the government with the evolutionary game method, and analyzed the different parameter requirements of the two sides′ evolutionary stable state. The main results were listed as follows. (1)In the selection of straw disposal, self interested farmers preferred burning, while social interested farmers preferred returning to the fields. (2)When the constraint conditions of farmers with different preference types changed, their preference would have a crowding in or crowding out effect, that is, from self interest preference to social preference or vice versa. So, the effective measures to solve the phenomenon of straw burning are to promote the change of farmers′ preference structure, increase the crowding in effect and reduce the crowding out effect. The policy enlightenment obtained from this is that it is of great significance to strengthen government policy publicity, technology promotion, formulation and implementation of laws and regulations, and cultivation of rural informal organizations, so as to promote the transformation from self interested farmers with preference to social farmers with preference, and improve farmers′ participation in and satisfaction with rural environmental governance such as straw return to farmland. |
| Key words: straw governance straw returning to field evolutionary game social preference farmers self interest preference farmers |
