水源地保护区生态补偿利益相关者行为选择机理分析

ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR SELECTION MECHANISMOF ECOLOGICAL COMPENSATION STAKEHOLDERS IN WATER SOURCE PROTECTION AREAS

关键词:  水源地保护区 生态补偿 利益相关者 行为

Key words:  the water source protection area  ecological compensation  stakeholder  behavior

摘要:

构建水源地保护区生态补偿机制涉及多个利益相关者，各个利益主体的利益诉求及其行为选择不同，影响到生态补偿机制的运行与实施，进而对水源地生态环境造成影响。文章利用利益相关者理论，对水源地保护区生态补偿中的利益相关者进行识别，并分析其利益诉求，将生态补偿中的利益相关者分为受偿者与补偿者，二者在生态补偿中的行为形成了一种博弈关系。利用博弈理论与方法，通过构建受偿者与补偿者的支付矩阵，分析了在水源地保护区的生态补偿中受偿者与补偿者的行为选择机理，给出了双方行为选择的混合战略纳什均衡点，从而得出了受偿者与补偿者的行为优化途径。研究结果表明：降低补偿者的风险偏好、监管成本以及受偿者不保护生态环境的超长收益，增加受偿者不保护生态环境的惩罚、潜在损失、信用损失以及生态环境保护内外收益差和合作期限，是减少水源地保护区污染的有效手段，并据此提出了健全监管体系、强化风险意识，以及健全诚信制度、完善生态补偿方式的优化策略。

Abstract:

The establishment of ecological compensation mechanism of water source protection area involves many stakeholders.The interest demandand the behavior selection of each stakeholderwasdifferentwhichaffected the operation and implementation of ecological compensation mechanism, and then affected the ecological environment in water source areas. In this paper, according to the stakeholder theory,firstit identified the stakeholders in the ecological compensation of water source protection areas, and then analyzedtheinterests of the stakeholders, andfinallythe stakeholders were divided into the compensator and the acceptor. In order to maximize the interests, the behavior choice of the compensator and the acceptorin the ecological compensation hadformed a kind of game.By using game theory and method, this paper first built the payment matrix of the construction of the compensator and the acceptor of the ecological compensationinthewater source area, and then analyzed the behavior selectionmechanism,gotthemixed strategy Nash equilibrium point of the behavior choice. Finally itobtainedthebehavior optimization approach of the compensator and the repayment of the ecological compensation in the water source area.Research results showed that there were some effective measures to reduce the pollution of water source protection areas, such as reducing the risk preference, supervision cost and the super long earningsinthe ecological compensation, and increasing punishments, the potential loss, and the credit lossof the acceptor without protecting the ecological environment, and increasing the inside and outside income differences of ecological environment protection and the cooperation time limit of the construction of the compensator in the ecological compensation.Finally, this paper put forward the following optimization strategies: improving the compensator's supervision system, strengthening the risk awareness of the compensator, as well as sounding social credit system in the ecological compensation, perfecting the optimization strategies of the ecological compensation.