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引用本文:戎丽丽,毕康蕾,胡继连.农用水权期权交易的触发机制研究[J].中国农业资源与区划,2024,45(2):10~27
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农用水权期权交易的触发机制研究
戎丽丽1,毕康蕾2,胡继连3
1.济南大学商学院,山东济南 250002;2.威海市商业银行,山东威海 264200;3.山东农业大学经济管理学院,泰安 271000
摘要:
目的 农用水权期权交易作为一种创新的水权交易模式,是金融助力绿色发展的新渠道。探究农用水权期权交易的触发条件及驱动因素,推动水期权交易模式应用于实践,是建设全国统一的用水权交易市场的重要内容。方法 文章基于农用水权期权交易触发这一新视角,构建农业用水者、工业用水者、政府管理部门以及金融机构四方演化博弈模型,运用复制动态方程和Lyapunov第一法则定性研究各博弈主体策略选择的稳定性及系统中可能存在的稳定均衡点,并利用Matlab2018b仿真分析关键要素对整体系统演化的影响。结果 农用水权期权费稍高定价、金融机构降低交易成本、政府管理部门公信力损失的提升、加大对金融机构经济补贴,会增加农业用水者、工业用水者、政府管理部门以及金融机构参与农用水权期权交易的概率。结论 农用水权期权交易的触发需要发挥政府职能,突破门槛效应。首先,通过对金融机构的经济补贴,激励金融机构选择创新金融业务;其次,金融机构发挥中介作用,通过合理定价农用水权期权费及降低交易成本的路径,触发农业用水者和工业用水者选择农用水权期权交易;此外,公信力损失会进一步增强对政府管理部门的约束力,最终实现农用水权期权交易触发的良性循环。
关键词:  农用水权  期权交易  演化博弈  触发机制  驱动因素
DOI:10.7621/cjarrp.1005-9121.20240202
分类号:F323.2
基金项目:国家社科基金资助项目“确权到户下农用水权规模化交易及其效应研究”(18BJJY075);山东省社科规划项目研究成果、山东省社科规划“重大理论和现实问题协同创新研究专项”(23CCXJ02)、山东社会科学院创新工程资助项目
STUDY ON TRIGGER MECHANISM OF AGRICULTURAL WATER RIGHT OPTION TRADING
Rong Lili1, Bi Kanglei2, Hu Jilian3
1.Business School, University of Jinan, Jinan 250002, Shandong, China;2.Weihai City Commercial Bank, Weihai 264200, Shandong, China;3.School of Economics and Management, Shandong Agricultural University, Tai'an 271000, Shandong, China
Abstract:
As an innovative water rights trading model, agricultural water rights option trading is a new channel for finance to help green development. Exploring the trigger conditions and driving factors of agricultural water rights option trading, and promoting the application of water options trading mode in practice, is also an important part of building a unified national water rights trading market.Based on practical considerations, and according to a new perspective of trigger of agricultural water right option transaction, this paper constructed a four-way evolutionary game model of agricultural water users, industrial water users, government management departments and financial institutions, qualitatively studied the stability of strategy choices of each game player and the possible stable equilibrium points in the system by using the replication dynamic equation and Lyapunov first rule, and then analyzed the influence of key elements on the overall system evolution by using Matlab2018b simulation. The results showed that the slightly higher pricing of agricultural water right option fees, the reduction of transaction costs by financial institutions, the enhancement of credibility loss of government administrative departments and the increase of economic subsidies to financial institutions respectively increased the probability of agricultural water users, industrial water users, government administrative departments and financial institutions participating in agricultural water right option trading, and the ESS strategy combination was stable.Therefore, the triggering of agricultural water rights option trading requires the government to play its role and break through the threshold effect. Firstly, by providing economic subsidies to financial institutions, they are encouraged to choose innovative financial businesses; Secondly, financial institutions play an intermediary role, triggering agricultural and industrial water users to choose agricultural water rights option trading by reasonably pricing agricultural water rights option fees and reducing transaction costs; In addition, the loss of credibility will further enhance the binding force on government management departments, ultimately achieving a virtuous cycle triggered by agricultural water rights option trading.
Key words:  agricultural water right  option trading  evolutionary game theory  trigger mechanism  driving factor
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