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引用本文:贾海刚,吴建瓴.蔬菜供应链价格博弈的内在逻辑、影响因素与稳定策略研究——基于过程追踪法对成都市蔬菜市场供应链的考察分析[J].中国农业资源与区划,2025,46(8):117~130
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蔬菜供应链价格博弈的内在逻辑、影响因素与稳定策略研究——基于过程追踪法对成都市蔬菜市场供应链的考察分析
贾海刚1,吴建瓴2
1.南京林业大学马克思主义学院,江苏南京 211189;2.成都大学统筹城乡协调发展研究中心,四川成都 610106
摘要:
目的 蔬菜价格是否稳定既关系到老百姓的“餐桌子”,也是影响到宏观经济指标的“内里子”,探究蔬菜价格形成的影响因素和稳定策略具有重要理论和现实意义。方法 文章在对西部中心城市成都市蔬菜市场供给来源、流通模式和销售终端等蔬菜商品社会生产总过程进行追踪分析的基础上,从正和博弈视角逐级分析蔬菜价格在生产、流通和销售等环节的形成过程以及使其保持长期稳定的技术构成和附加影响因素,评析中间环节扁平化等是否真正有助于蔬菜价格稳定。结果 “供应链扁平化”是伪命题,中间环节过多有其存在的合理性;“农超对接”模式是理想模型,离开政府补贴尚不能苟活;“最后一公里” 加价过高的言论有失公允,终端加价是宏观政策驱动的结果;商家联合人为操纵垄断蔬菜价格等行为假设不成立;菜农扩大种植规模并不能解决供需矛盾等。结论 蔬菜价格不受人为因素操纵,每个环节加价幅度均是多主体长期博弈的结果,导致蔬菜价格波动实质原因是宏观政策变动。保持蔬菜价格长期稳定的最优路径是政府适时、适地给予补贴,在蔬菜生产端、流通端及销售终端等任何环节给予政府补贴,均可在相应环节降低加价幅度,也就保持住了蔬菜价格稳定性。
关键词:  蔬菜  价格  供应链  博弈  稳定  成都市
DOI:10.7621/cjarrp.1005-9121.20250810
分类号:F323.7
基金项目:国家社会科学基金一般项目“乡村振兴战略赋能农民持续增收的机制构建研究”(22BKS142);江苏高校“青蓝工程”资助(苏教师函[2024]14号)
INTERNAL LOGIC, INFLUENCING FACTORS AND STABLE STRATEGY OF PRICE GAME IN VEGETABLE SUPPLY CHAIN*——INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN OF CHENGDU VEGETABLE MARKET BASED ON PROCESS TRACING METHOG
Jia Haigang1, Wu Jianling2
1.College of Marxism, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, China;2.Research Center for Coordinated Urban and Rural Development, Chengdu University, Chengdu 610106, Sichuan, China
Abstract:
Whether the price of vegetables is stable is not only related to the "table" of the people, but also affects the "inner" of macroeconomic indicators. It has important theoretical and practical significance to explore the influencing factors and stability strategies of the formation of vegetable prices. Based on the tracking analysis of the total social production process of vegetable commodities such as the supply source, circulation mode and sales terminal of vegetable market in the central city of Chengdu in western China, the formation process of vegetable prices in production, circulation and sales, as well as the technical composition and additional influencing factors that made it maintained long-term stability were analyzed from the perspective of positive sum game. And whether the intermediate link flattening really contribute to vegetable price stability was evaluated. The results were showed as follows. "Supply chain flattening" was a false proposition, the existence of too many intermediate links was reasonable; The model of "connecting agriculture and super" was the ideal model, but it was difficult to survive without government subsidies. "The last kilometer price increase was too high" remarks were unfair, the final price increase was the result of macro policy drive; The hypothesis that merchants jointly artificially manipulate monopoly vegetable prices was not valid; Vegetable farmers expanding planting scale could not solve the contradiction between supply and demand. In summary, the price of vegetables is not manipulated by human factors, and the price increase range of each link is the result of long-term game of multi-subjects, which leads to the substantial reason for the fluctuation of vegetable prices is the change of macro policies. The optimal way to maintain long-term stability of vegetable prices is for the government to provide subsidies at a timely and appropriate time. If government subsidies are given in any link such as vegetable production, distribution and sales terminals, the mark-up range can be reduced in the corresponding link, and the stability of vegetable prices can be maintained.
Key words:  vegetables  prices  supply chain  game theory  stability  Chengdu
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