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引用本文:夏子涵,李建宇,王艳伟.乡村特色产业项目多主体协同发展机制研究——基于行动者网络视角[J].中国农业资源与区划,2025,46(4):240~254
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乡村特色产业项目多主体协同发展机制研究——基于行动者网络视角
夏子涵,李建宇,王艳伟
云南农业大学建筑工程学院,昆明 650201
摘要:
目的 文章旨在探讨参与乡村振兴项目的四方参与意愿和策略选择,以提高各方的参与度。方法 基于行动者网络理论,建立了一个理解各方行为策略的框架,并使用演化博弈方法模拟了各方在不同因素下的稳定策略。结果 (1)在政企村合作模式中,村企合作带来的收益和村集体的投资重建至关重要。当这些收益超过一定临界值时,就实现了理想的策略组合。(2)在村企合作模式中,关键因素是村集体合作社的建设成本、村集体的出资成本和村民的持股成本。当村民的持股成本低于一定水平时,他们更有可能积极参与。(3)如果村集体的自主经营能够盈利,增加建设规模或降低出资成本可以促进村集体更快地向稳定战略靠拢。(4)村集体的项目风险对各种因素高度敏感,单个企业在产业基金中的占比可作为政府决策的重要依据。结论 要推进乡村特色产业的协同发展,在制定战略时必须考虑乡村的实际收入和现有的产业资源。
关键词:  乡村振兴  特色产业项目  演化博弈  合作机制  策略选择
DOI:10.7621/cjarrp.1005-9121.20250420
分类号:F323
基金项目:国家自然科学基金“政府和社会资本合作项目韧性的形成机理、评价模型及提升路径研究”(72261035);云南省省院省校教育合作人文社科项目“云南乡村振兴项目融投建管模式创新研究”(SYSX202202)
STUDY ON THE MECHANISM OF MULTI-BODY SYNERGISTIC DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL SPECIALTY INDUSTRY PROJECTS*——BASED ON THE PERSPECTIVE OF ACTOR NETWORKS
Xia Zihan, Li Jianyu, Wang Yanwei
School of Architecture and Engineering, Yunnan Agricultural University, Kunming 650201, Yunnan, China
Abstract:
This study aims to investigate the participation willingness and strategy choices of the four parties involved in rural revitalization projects to enhance their engagement. Applying actor network theory, we developed a framework to understand the behavioural strategies of the parties and used an evolutionary game approach to simulate their stable strategies under various factors. The results were showed as follows. (1) In the government-enterprise-village cooperation model, the benefits from village-enterprise collaboration and the village collective's investment and reconstruction were crucial. The ideal strategy combination was achieved when these benefits exceeded certain thresholds. (2) In the village-enterprise-people cooperation model, the key factors were the construction cost of the village collective cooperative, the contribution cost of the village collective, and the villagers' shareholding cost. When the villagers' shareholding cost was below a certain level, they were more likely to participate actively. (3) Additionally, if the village collective's self-operation was profitable, increasing the construction scale or reducing the contribution cost could promote quicker convergence to a stable strategy. (4) The village collective's project risk was highly sensitive to various factors, and the proportion of individual enterprises in the industrial fund may serve as a critical basis for government decision-making. Therefore, to advance the synergistic development of village characteristic industries, it is essential to consider the village's actual income and existing industrial resources when formulating strategies.
Key words:  rural revitalization  special industry projects  evolutionary game  cooperation mechanisms  strategic choice
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